The effect of Domestic Political Rhetoric on Relations with Islamic Countries

Some recent remarks made by the activists of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on Prophet Mohammad have created an unexpected political crisis between the Islamic nations and New Delhi. 

More than 15 Islamic countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have issued statements condemning the vote. India rushed to make up for the loss as diplomats issued statements excluding party workers from the government's role.

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There were Islamist groups trying to take advantage of this political rift, which had a strategy of trying and working in the midst of Hindu-Muslim tensions behind communal divisions in India, especially the BJP's Hindu-nationalist political structure. As soon as the countries made these statements, Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) also issued a statement on Indian television mocking the statements made against the Prophet and threatening terrorist attacks on Indian cities and states. This statement tried to motivate the Muslims in India to wage a historical and cultural war, which can be seen as a deviation from the story which is largely ideological, now also trying to include land and geography.

As soon as the countries made these statements, Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) also issued a statement on Indian television mocking the statements made against the Prophet and threatening terrorist attacks on Indian cities and states.

Earlier, Al Qaeda's head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, during a lengthy and winding solo show released by video, raised Indian issues such as the hijab row in March this year. Both IS and AQ propaganda outputs place hijab rows on their covers at the same time. Zawahiri, whose whereabouts were unknown until 2021, has returned to a more publicly visible incarnation by releasing promotional material. Even after Zawahiri's 'return' to the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan and subsequent other claims, the relationship between the AQ and the Taliban is close to the publication of the UN assessment. The AQIS threat release garnered extensive media coverage, piggybacking and significant mileage at mainstream outlets - exactly what it is designed for. Specifically, AQIS Statement Urdu,

Both Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State have not had much success when it comes to online propaganda and Indian space. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), IS's Wilayah in Afghanistan, issued a 55-page pamphlet targeting the Hindu-Nationalist narrative, specifically targeting more than the Indian government, cooperation with the Taliban and earlier meetings with Indian diplomats in Kabul. This month. In this pamphlet, the ISKP, more curiously, apparently calls on the Islamic State of India (ISHP) to "break the peace" and "gear up". This raises interesting questions: If ISHP is indeed the main and official part of the structure of the global organization of IS, then why does ISKP not know about the operational status of ISHP?

In particular, IS has sought to position itself at the center of ethnic tensions in India, using it to further divide communities and radicalize the youth. The first issue of IS's India-specific online publication, 'Saut Al Hind' (Voice of Hind in English), was published in February 2020 during the ethnic unrest in the Indian capital. Since then, IS propaganda has sought to take small claims of attack. To promote corruption among Islamic ulema in India in Kashmir and when leaders of the Muslim community called for the elimination of ethnic tensions and promoted democracy and secularism.

As al-Qaeda and IS gain more global control as an international Islamic group, their main counterparts in India, especially in Kashmir, such as the Pakistan-backed terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, are more supportive. -Pakitra of Pakistan, does not go away from their main cause, which is Kashmir. This offline reality contradicts the online presence of AQ and IS in the most volatile parts of India, serving almost as a deterrent by denying space to international jihadist groups in the country’s most volatile conflict theater.

However, despite the increase in targeted promotions, there are no big data points to confirm that recruitment for IS or AQ has increased. In fact, the number of Indians joining any of these groups is negligible overall. From Indian examples, the biggest recruitment tool for IS is the caliphate itself, and a few dozen people tried to join the group between 2013 and 2017 with the intention of going into that geography. With the dissolution of the Khilafah, the number of IS supporters from India has also declined sharply, despite online propaganda by the group and its followers.

Khalifa was the biggest recruiting tool for IS and motivated a few dozen people to join the group between 2013 and 2017 with the aim of moving into that geography.

Yet there is a gap between big data and research on how the public can use such propaganda. For example, AQIS has issued its statement in three languages, but not Hindi, which is spoken and understood most by both Hindus and Muslims in the northern part of India's most densely populated areas, raising interesting questions about their target audience. And while this is based solely on case evidence for the time being, it seems that most AQ and IS propaganda in India has had a very limited impact on the local population and communities, despite the overall failure - with few exceptions - the Internet to declassify such content.

While we spend a lot of time studying the movement from online fundamentalism to acts of offline terrorism, it is equally important to look at other forms of ideological violent extremism, such as online jihadism, terrorism, and offline right-wing extremism. Real-world events in communities and communities also use online space to escalate ideological battles and grievances. As you know, while terrorist and terrorist groups use the Internet and online platforms as their main means of disseminating propaganda, ideological tensions already created on the ground also use the Internet to increase such tensions, which can lead to local grievances. A national debate.

Finding IS India-related content on many platforms, including Telegram, is already difficult, as groups and accounts are removed more efficiently than ever before. Despite the vastness of the Internet, it serves as a basic and effective deterrent, as most users of such platforms have a basic knowledge of technology. However, those who search for such content do not yet have to go to great lengths to interact with extremist content online.

Finally, from an Indian perspective, a clear response through counter-narratives, CVE programs designed for the Internet, and other such actions, few people are found in law enforcement agencies. There is an ideology that counter-narratives and CVE programs have failed to deliver the expected results, but confronting online fundamentalism in large parts of the developing world is a less studied and less resource-driven discipline, although Internet use is growing rapidly. This part of the world

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